This paper compares a clean energy standard (CES) and a carbon tax (CT), using theory and quantitative experiments. A two-stage duopolistic competition in the electricity sector between a polluting plant and its non-polluting rival anchors the model underlying these experiments. The CT induces both plants to contribute to clean electricity, whereas the CES only incentivizes the non-polluting plant. Ultimately, what matters for the ranking of these instruments is the size of the pre-existing competitive gap between the two rival plants. When this gap is sufficiently small, the CES becomes the more cost-effective instrument, irrespective of the pre-specified emissions reduction target.
Introduction
The centerpiece of public policy aimed at reducing emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) is the instrument chosen to implement it. There are two main types of policy instruments: …scal instruments-e.g., carbon tax and cap-and-trade-and regulatory mandates-e.g., the clean energy standard. The debate over which of these two classes of instruments of climate policy is the more cost-e¤ective took a new twist recently. Prior to 2016, the existing literature unanimously favored …scal instruments over regulatory mandates. However, focusing on the electricity sector, Goulder et al. (2016) show that for modest emissions reduction targets, regulatory mandates such as the clean energy standard can out-perform …scal instruments on cost-e¤ectiveness grounds. This …nding is interesting because, like import quotas in trade policy, regulatory mandates are a more direct and precise form of intervention than …scal instruments whose optimal level is not easily determined in the real world.
However, it is interesting to note that all existing assessments of the relative performances of these two types of instruments of climate policy have been carried out exclusively in model environments where competition between energy suppliers is perfect, and includes only one stage, namely the output stage. Yet, competition, whether perfect or imperfect, gives …rms or plants an incentive to be innovative (Holland et al. 2009 ). This naturally opens up two di¤erent stages in which these agents compete with one another: an innovation stage, and the subsequent output stage. 4 Further, with particular reference to the electricity generation sector, even though several political jurisdictions have enacted laws lowering barriers to entry into the generation side of the electricity market, there is evidence that market power persists (Joskow and Tirole 2007) . 5 These facts suggest that imperfect competition and innovation are fundamental features of the electricity generation sector. 4 Goulder and Mathai (2000) introduce innovation in their assessment of the cost-e¤ectiveness of a carbon tax. However, they are not explicitly concerned with the e¤ect of competition in the electricity generation market, nor are they explicitly concerned with instrument choice. 5 The Energy Policy Act enacted in 2005 by the US federal government is a good example. Among other things, this Act provides loan guarantees for entities involved in the use innovative technologies that enhance emission-free energy production.
Studies that ignore this fact inadvertently shut down realistic microeconomic mechanisms by which the burdens of climate policy are channeled on to households. This paper shows that opening the microeconomic black box of the e¤ects of climate policy can shed new light into sources of heterogeneity in the ranking of potential instruments for implementing such policy.
We use a calibrated two sector-general equilibrium model to explore the implications of technological innovation and imperfect competition for the ranking of the carbon tax (hereafter, CT) and the clean energy standard (hereafter, CES), based on their relative cost-e¤ectiveness at achieving a pre-speci…ed emissions reduction target in the electricity sector. 6 Our model combines strategic and non-strategic elements as characteristics of the interactions between the di¤erent agents comprising the economy. Non-strategic elements essentially characterize the interactions between a stand-in household, and …rms that use labor services and supply the …nal good consumed. Strategic elements, in contrast, are a feature of the industrial organization of the electricity generation sector. In this sector, two power plants engage in a two-stage competition to supply electricity. They di¤er from one another with respect to two important characteristics: the technology used to generate electricity and the relative e¢ ciency with which they each supply the market.
One power plant operates a technology that emits GHGs as a by-product of electricity generation (e.g., a coal-…red power plant), while the other generates electricity with an emission-free technology (e.g., a windmill farm). The latter faces a pre-existing competitive disadvantage for generating electricity with emission-free sources, and may look to overturn this disadvantage through technological innovation.
From a microeconomic perspective, the issue confronting climate policy is how to expand the output of clean electricity relative to that of "dirty" electricity at the lowest 6 By restricting our quantitative assessment of the relative cost-e¤ectiveness of the CT vis-à-vis the CES to the electricity sector, we do not by any mean claim that this sector is the only source of GHGs emissions. Instead, the focus on this sector is motivated by the facts that it is one of the largest sources of GHGs emissions. For example, in 2013, the US Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) estimated that the power generation sector accounted for 31 % of all GHGs emissions in the US. Furthermore, this sector is also one where intensity standards are still widely used to mitigate GHGs emissions, particularly in the United States-29 States-, and Canada-at the federal level (OECD 2015) . possible cost to the economy. A key insight conveyed by our model is that the CT has a diversi…cation e¤ect on the production of clean electricity, whereas the CES has a specialization e¤ect instead. The CT induces both the non-polluting plant and its polluting rival to contribute to expanding the output of clean electricity, at the expense of that of "dirty" electricity. Underlying this diversi…cation e¤ect of the CT is the fact that it makes the polluting plant pay for the uncontrolled by-production of GHGs, thus bumping up its operational costs, and exerting a downward pressure on its market share relative to the non-polluting plant. To protect its market share, therefore, the polluting plant may invest in a technological innovation aimed at out-…tting its production unit with an e¢ cient device for controlling emissions. An example of such emissions abatement technology is the so-called carbon capture and sequestration technology (also known as CCS technology), which allows the plant to produce clean electricity with polluting sources, proportionately to the quantity of GHG emissions successfully captured and sequestrated. 7 In contrast, the CES ties the polluting plant's level of output to the mandated minimum ratio of clean, over total, electricity generated. In compliance with this minimum ratio, the polluting plant can only raise its output in proportion to the increase in the non-polluting plant's output. In that sense, our model shows that the CES, unlike the CT, provides the polluting plant with virtually no incentive to invest in a CCS technology that would have enhanced its contribution to the production of clean electricity through carbon capture and sequestration. The CES mandate, as a result, essentially leaves the non-polluting plant as the only source of clean electricity. This CES-induced specialization e¤ect provides the non-polluting plant with the incentive to overturn its pre-existing competitive disadvantage through investment in a productivity-enhancing innovation. 7 In November 2014, The Wall Street Journal reported that an emissions restriction on coal-…red power plants was a major driver for the emergence, in the Canadian Province of Saskatchewan, of the world's …rst commercial-scale coal power plant equipped with CCS. It is reported that this technology allowed for the capture of about 90% of the CO 2 generated by SaskPower's Boundary Power Dam-a coal-…red power plant. Further, the same article reports that CCS technology is not the only innovative path to "clean coal" as, "state-of-the-art coal-…red power plants are being built with much higher e¢ ciencies that result in a 20% reduction in CO 2 emissions per kilowatt-hour of electricity produced." See: Does 'Clean Coal' Technology Have a Future? Published online at http://www.wsj.com/articles/does-clean-coal-technologyhave-a-future-1416779351.
In a nutshell, from a microeconomic perspective, what matters for the ranking of these two instruments of climate policy is the size of the pre-existing competitive gap between the two rival power plants. When this competitive gap is large, it is like a "boulder" trapping the cost-e¤ective expansion of the clean electricity output. On one hand, the technological e¤ort the disadvantaged non-polluting plant must exert to pull this "boulder" out of the path to expansion of clean electricity production may only yield very little in terms of improving its competitive position. On the other hand, a large pre-existing competitive advantage for the polluting plant gives it enough leeway to invest in a CCS technology to boost its production of clean electricity, without losing its competitive edge over the non-polluting plant. In this context, these two related facts seem to hand the advantage to the CT, which, unlike the CES, induces both plants to inadvertently join forces in pulling this "boulder" out of the path to a cost-e¤ective expansion of clean electricity production.
However, when the pre-existing competitive gap between the two power plants is small, for the disadvantaged non-pollutant plant, it reduces to a "pebble" size obstacle to the expansion of its clean electricity output. In this context, the CES' specialization e¤ect provides this non-polluting plant with the stimulus enabling it to kick that "pebble" out of the path to a cost-e¤ective production of clean electricity. In contrast, the CT-induced diversi…cation e¤ect loses its edge, because with only a small pre-existing competitive advantage, the polluting plant no longer has the leeway that would allow it to invest in a CCS technology without losing its competitive edge. The insights conveyed through these intuitive microeconomic e¤ects of climate policy therefore suggest that the CES may be more cost-e¤ective than the CT, when the pre-existing cost-disadvantage of the nonpolluting plant is su¢ ciently small, with the reverse being true when this disadvantage is su¢ ciently large.
Our quantitative analysis formally establishes this prediction. There are three steps to this quantitative cost-e¤ectiveness analysis. In the …rst step, we calibrate the model to match selected macroeconomic data of the US economy for the period 2012 -2013. In the calibrated model, there is neither a CT nor a CES. The equilibrium values of the variables computed in this context thus represent Laissez-faire values. The goal of climate policy is to reduce the Laissez-faire level of GHG emissions to an exogenously given recommended level, under revenue-neutrality. Climate policy is revenue-neutral whenever it keeps the level of the Laissez-faire tax revenue unchanged.
In the second step of our cost-e¤ectiveness analysis, we introduce climate policy whose aim is to reduce the Laissez-faire level of GHG emissions by 10%, and compute the level of a given policy instrument used to implement this reduction, as well as all other policysensitive macroeconomic variables. Technically, this consists of numerically solving a system of equations. When the CT is the chosen policy instrument, this system involves …ve equations in …ve unknowns, whereas the corresponding system under the CES consists of seven equations in seven unknowns. We then compare the values of the macroeconomic variables generated by this experiment to their Laissez-faire counterparts. We make this comparison in a context where the relative cost-disadvantage of the non-polluting plant is set at 1:92, as estimated from the US data. In other words, the pre-existing marginal cost of the non-polluting plant is 92% higher than that of its polluting rival. For these speci…c parameter values, our computations show that the CT dominates the CES on cost-e¤ectiveness grounds.
In the third and …nal step, we explore potential sources of heterogeneity in the ranking of these two instruments of climate policy. We …rst vary the pre-speci…ed emissions reduction target, moving from modest, to more ambitious, targets, while holding the level of the pre-existing cost-disadvantage of the non-polluting plant constant at 1:92. We then repeat this experiment for di¤erent levels of this cost-disadvantage that are consistent with a duopolistic market structure. 8 Our quantitative results show that when the pre-existing cost-disadvantage of the non-polluting plant drops from 1:92 to 1:50, the CES emerges as the more cost-e¤ective instrument of climate policy, irrespective of the pre-speci…ed emissions reduction target. Our analysis thus establishes the size of the pre-existing competitive disadvantage of the non-polluting plant as a very important source of heterogeneity in the 8 Indeed, above a level of cost-disadvantage equal to 2.1, the electricity generation market becomes a monopoly with the polluting plant as the only supplier. 
The Environment
Consider a Regulator who wants to achieve a pre-speci…ed emissions reduction target in the electricity generation sector. One can think of as the percentage reduction in the status quo's emissions level, resulting from the implementation of this climate policy.
Suppose that to achieve this target, the Regulator has a choice between the carbon tax (CT), specifying the price, d , a polluting power plant must pay for each unit of GHG released in the atmosphere, and the clean energy standard (CES), mandating the minimum ratio of clean electricity over total electricity generated x c 2 (0; 1) that the sector must comply with. For all > 0, denote the Regulator's choice of climate policy instrument as g 2 f d ; x c g. For any given instrument g selected, the Regulator's problem is to set the level of this instrument such that the resulting level of emissions represents a proportion 1 of its Laissez-faire level. The higher , the more ambitious the emissions reduction target.
The aim of this paper to compare d and x c , based on their relative cost-e¤ectiveness at meeting the target . In what follows, we describe the model environment providing the framework for our comparative cost-e¤ectiveness analysis.
There is a stand-in household endowed with one unit of labor and who is the absentee owner of all …rms and plants operating in the economy. 10 There are two production sectors.
In the …nal good sector, there is a representative …rm that produces a composite consumption good using electricity and labor. In the electricity sector, there are two power plants each endowed with an exclusive right over the use of a di¤erent, non-transferable, technology for generating electricity. One such technology generates electricity with polluting sources-e.g., coal-, while the other technology generates electricity with non-polluting sources-e.g., wind, solar, or geothermal technologies, hydro-power, or nuclear reactors, all of which are negligible sources of GHGs. For ease of exposition, we abstract away from household consumption of electricity, and instead assume that all the electricity generated is consumed by the non-household sector.
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The …nal good market is perfectly competitive, while the electricity market is duopolistic and characterized by a two stage competition. At the start of the economy, the nonpolluting power plant has a pre-existing cost-disadvantage for electricity generation relative to its polluting rival, and must invest in technological innovation to reduce, and eventually overturn, this disadvantage. For the plant generating electricity with polluting sources, depending on which climate policy instrument is used, it may or may not invest in technological innovation. For this plant, innovation essentially aimed at out-…tting its production unit with an emissions abatement technology, such as the well known CCS technology.
When such innovation occurs, the polluting plant becomes a contributor to the production of "clean" electricity, proportionately to the quantity of GHGs successfully captured and sequestrated.
Preferences and Budget Constraint
Since we are not concerned with the distributional e¤ects of climate policy, we rely on the concept of a stand-in household to craft a measure of the burden such policy puts on households. In particular, we take the stand-in household's equilibrium utility level as a proxy for social welfare. As welfare thus de…ned is responsive to climate policy, we interpret a climate policy-induced decrease in its level as a measure of the burden a given policy instrument puts on the economy. In what follows, we detail the steps underlying our characterization of social welfare.
The stand-in household has preferences over consumption of the numeraire, c, leisure, l, and a public good G. These preferences are described as follows:
where 2 (0; 1), c 0 denotes the subsistence level of consumption, and > 0. Provision of the public good is …nanced by tax revenue.
The stand-in household budget constraint is given by:
where R denotes the income tax rate, !, the labor wage, and , the level of pro…ts earned and formally de…ned further below. Utility maximization by the representative household yields the following labor supply function:
In other words, having more income from non-labor sources tends to reduce the stand-in household's labor supply (i.e., @L S =@ < 0); whereas a higher income tax tends to raise this labor supply (i.e., @L S =@ R > 0), due to the subsistence constraint for consumption.
Moreover, if the subsistence requirement for consumption is not too large, then the standin household labor supply tends to rise with an increase in the wage (i.e., @L S =@! > 0).
Thus factors that de ‡ate the wage tend to discourage labor supply.
Combining (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3), we obtain the stand-in household optimal welfare level as follows:
where := ln + (1
Expression (2.4) provides a basis for assessing the economic costs of climate policy.
In particular, we interpret a climate policy-induced decrease in the level of (2.4) as a measure of the burden this policy puts on households. Given a pre-speci…ed emissions reduction target to be achieved by climate policy, the more cost-e¤ective policy instrument is therefore one that yields the smallest decrease in the level of U ( R ; !; ; G). We will return to this issue in our quantitative analysis further below.
Production of the Final Good
The …nal good is a composite numeraire whose production process combines electricity, X, and labor, L, to obtain a level of output described by the following Cobb-Douglas technology:
where ; are the output elasticities of electricity and labor, respectively, and satisfy
The inequality in (2.6) implies that the term A captures the impact of other production factors such as land and physical capital, for example, whose level is assumed to be exogenously given. The representative …rm in the …nal good sector purchases a quantity of electricity, X, at a market price, P x , and hire L units of labor at a market wage, !.
Pro…t-maximization thus yields the following demand functions:
where " := 1
To keep the model more tractable, the labor supply function in (2.3) and the inputs' demand functions in (2.7) and (2.8) can all be linearized respectively as follows using …rst order Taylor Series Expansions that preserve all their original properties:
The linearization in (2.9) preserves all the properties of the labor supply function in (2.3) for all ! satisfying
Combining (2.9) and (2.11) yields the following market-clearing wage:
(2.13)
In other words, a higher electricity price tends to reduce the labor wage because it decreases the demand for electricity, which, in turn, reduces labor productivity in the …nal good sector, thus inducing the representative …rm to cut its demand for labor.
To characterize the market demand for electricity, we combine (2.10) and (2.13) by way of substitution, re-arranging terms to get:
where
Since ! p p ! > 0 by construction, the term p ( R ; ) is strictly positive so that the inverse demand function in (2.14) is well-behaved.
Electricity Generation Sector
The two plants generating electricity are indexed by j 2 fc; dg, and produce electricity from two di¤erent sources, a clean source (j = c) and a dirty source (j = d). Each plant j generates a quantity of electricity X j at a constant marginal cost described further below.
Thus, total supply of electricity is
which, under market-clearing, implies that
The pre-existing marginal cost of generating electricity with non-polluting sources is c . In the case of renewable sources of electricity, one can think of c as capturing the severity of the intermittency and/or grid problems facing Plant c prior to any technological innovation. Therefore, if Plant c invests in a technological innovation aimed at mitigating its pre-existing technical problems, its production technology will be up-graded at a level of e¢ ciency, c 2 [0; 1], corresponding to the fraction of the initial marginal cost, c , knocked down. Thus, Plant c will face a post-innovation investment marginal cost given by:
However, innovation is costly and Plant c must incur a cost c ( c ) 2 for achieving a level of technological up-grade c , where c > 0 is an exogenously e¢ ciency parameter. Therefore, given (g; X d ), the net pro…t generated by Plant c's operations is:
where P x denotes the market price as de…ned in (2.16). Plant c's problem is to choose 
units of GHGs. One can therefore think of (1 d ) X d as the share of "dirty" electricity generated by Plant d, which implies that the share of clean electricity generated Plant d is
Plant d's carbon tax outlay thus reduces to
Factoring in the additional cost induced by the carbon tax outlay, the actual marginal cost of generating electricity with fossil fuel thus has two components, including d and the contribution of the carbon tax outlay to the marginal cost, d (1 d ) . Therefore, when the CT is the instrument of climate policy selected by the Regulator, plant d's post innovation marginal cost is 
To the extent that the CES is binding, from (2.23), it follows that Plant d's best output response function to Plant c's output strategy X c becomes exogenously given by
In other words, when a CES x c is mandated, Plant d reacts to its rival's choice of output strategy X c , by choosing to play the strategy d ( d ; x c ; X c ). Observe that compliance with the CES mandate implies that to reach the production stage (i.e., X d > 0), the polluting plant must choose the level of innovation e¤ort d such that:
Condition (2.25) implies that, for modest emissions reduction targets (i.e., x c is su¢ ciently small), the CES does not provide the polluting plant with an incentive to contribute to the production of clean electricity through investment in a CCS technology. Emissions reduction targets will have to be su¢ ciently high for the CES to provide this plant with the incentive to invest in a CCS technology. This fact implies that the CES essentially promotes specialization as a feature of clean electricity production, as it tends to prevent the polluting plant from contributing to clean electricity production.
Let us turn next to the characterization of Plant d's pro…t function. Given (g; X c ),
if the CES is binding
while under a binding CES mandate, this problem reduces to
because Plant d's output best response function is exogenously given under the CES.
Timing of Events
The timing of events in this economy is thus as follows. In the beginning of the period, the immediately after, the market for the …nal good opens, and …nally consumption of the …nal good takes place, and the economy ends.
Analytics
Our analytical results are disciplined by the equilibrium of this two-sector economy. In de…ning the equilibrium, care must be taken to distinguish between strategic and nonstrategic elements. The key strategic element is the two-stage non-cooperative game between the non-polluting (c), and the polluting (d), plant. The …nal good sector is perfectly competitive, and thus provides the non-strategic elements of the equilibrium, along with the stand-in household optimal decisions. Interactions between strategic and non-strategic elements underlie equilibrium conditions, which we characterize for each policy regime g 2 f d ; x c g. In this convex environment, and for each policy regime, g, an equilibrium necessarily exists. Due to structural di¤erences between the two policy regimes, we characterize this equilibrium one such regime at a time.
Equilibrium Under the CT Regime
Equilibrium variables under the CT include the Nash-equilibrium of the non-cooperative game between the two rival plants in the electricity sector, ^ c ;^ d ;X c ;X d , the pair of pro…t levels, (^ c ;^ d ), one per electricity generation plant, the labor wage,!, the aggregate demand for electricity,X, the level of GHG emissions,Ê, the electricity price,P x , and the residual claim in the …nal good sector,^ y .
To characterize this equilibrium, we start by solving for the Nash equilibrium of the two-stage noncooperative game between the two plants, c and d. 
denotes total pro…ts accrued to the stand-in household as the absentee owner of all …rms and plants.
Partial derivation of (3.1) and (3.2) respectively, yields the following results. To derive the best-response functions for the two players at the innovation stage of the game, we need the following assumption:
The following inequalities simultaneously hold:
Assumption 1 ensures that each player's payo¤ function is strictly concave in its choice variable, so that its best response function exists and is well-de…ned. Therefore, under Assumption 1, the unique Nash equilibrium of the innovation subgame is characterized by:
Given the outcome of this two-stage noncooperative game, we can now compute the equilibrium pro…ts levels for both Plant c and Plant d. Indeed from (2.18) and (2.26), we can just rewrite these pro…ts as follows:
where^ c and^ d are as de…ned in (3.8) and (3.9) . Recall that these pro…ts accrued to the stand-in household-the absentee owner of all plants.
Aggregate and Household Variables under the CT Regime
We next characterize the remaining equilibrium variables under a CT regime. From (3.1) and (3.2), we obtain equilibrium total electricity output as follows:
Straightforward di¤erentiation of (3.12) yields the following claims:
The carbon tax tends to have a negative e¤ect on total electricity outputX;
(ii) Plants'respective innovation e¤orts, in contrast, tend to have a positive e¤ect on this output;
(iii) Further, the higher the non-polluting plant's pre-existing cost-disadvantage (i.e., the higher c ), the lower this output.
Claim 2 suggests that the carbon tax tends to induce an increase in the electricity price.
The chain of reactions triggered by this price increase is most likely to result in a decrease in the stand-in household's welfare, as we show in our quantitative experiment. However, Claim 2-(ii) states that both plants'respective innovation e¤orts may (partially) mitigate this negative output e¤ect of the carbon tax, which in turn, may mitigate its negative welfare e¤ect. Hence the importance of expanding competition in the electricity sector to include the innovation stage.
From (2.19) substituting in (3.2), yields the total level of GHGs released in the atmosphere as follows:
Unfortunately partial di¤erentiation of (3.13) yields blurred pictures of the e¤ect of the emissions reduction policy on the equilibrium level of GHG emissions.
Next, from (2.13) substituting in (2.16) and (3.12), we obtain the equilibrium wage level as follows:
Expression (3.14) shows how Plants'respective innovation e¤orts a¤ect the labor wage:
The carbon tax tends to have a negative e¤ect on the wage rate!;
(ii) Plants'respective innovation e¤orts, in contrast, tend to have a positive e¤ect on this wage; (iii) Further, the higher the non-polluting plant's pre-existing cost-disadvantage (i.e., the higher c ), the lower this wage.
Claim 3 continues the chain of reactions triggered by the e¤ect of the carbon tax on total electricity output (see Claim 2 above). The decrease in the wage is a result of the decrease in the demand for labor, itself induced by a decrease in the supply of electricity.
Again, since the carbon induces abatement by the polluting plant through technological innovation, its negative e¤ect on the wage is (partially) mitigated by the polluting plant's innovation e¤ort,^ d .
From (2.3), we thus obtain the aggregate labor supply under the CT regime as follows:
Using (3.12) and (3.15), along with pro…t-maximizing conditions, it can be shown that the equilibrium residual claim in the …nal good sector thus iŝ
(1 )
For the stand-in household, total pre-tax income iŝ
Finally, tax revenue under the CT regime has two sources, including an income tax and the carbon tax:T
An equilibrium under the CT regime thus reduces to a system of 3 equations, (3.10), (3.11) and (3.16) respectively, in 3 unknowns,^ c ,^ d , and^ y respectively. All remaining variables can be computed given the solution to this system of equations.
Equilibrium under the CES Regime
Under the CES regime, a general equilibrium has a similar de…nition to that given under the CT regime above. However, the strategic elements of this equilibrium are quite di¤erent under the CES regime compared to the CT regime described above.
Under this regime, the Regulator determines the relative share of clean electricity x c 2 (0; 1), in total electricity generated, X = X c + X d . A necessary and su¢ cient condition for the CES mandate to be binding is that
If this condition doesn't hold, then the CES has no e¤ect on Plant d's output. Under this condition, we show in Appendix B that the Nash equilibrium of the Cournot subgame is as follows:
The following claim can therefore be made from straightforward partial derivation of This claim establishes the output substitution e¤ect of the CES mandate.
From (3.20) and (3.21) , it holds that total electricity output under the CES mandate is:
The following claims derive from straightforward di¤erentiation of expression (3.22).
Claim 5. (i)
The CES mandate tends to reduce total electricity output X ;
(ii) Total electricity output is increasing in either plant's innovation e¤ort;
(iii) The higher the non-polluting plant's pre-existing cost-disadvantage (i.e., the higher c ), the lower total electricity output under the CES.
Completing the backward induction process, we show in Appendix B that the Nashequilibrium of the …rst-stage innovation subgame must solve the following system of two equations in two unknowns:
Given the solution to this system, ( c ; d ), we obtain the distribution of pro…ts between the two plants as follows:
where 
Next, from (2.13) substituting in (2.16) and (3.22), we obtain the equilibrium wage level as follows:
Straightforward di¤erentiation of (3.32) yields the following claims:
Claim 6. (i) The CES mandate tends to have a negative e¤ect the wage ! ;
(ii)This negative e¤ect is mitigated by an increase by either plant's innovation e¤ort;
(iii) In contrast, an increase in the non-polluting plant's pre-existing marginal cost c tends to compound this negative e¤ect.
The equilibrium labor supply, and the residual claim under the CES are given respectively by
The stand-in household pre-tax income R , thus is given by
Finally, tax revenue under the CES regime only has one source, namely household income:
Under the CES policy regime, an equilibrium is a system of 5 equations, (3.23), (3.24), 
Quantitative analysis
In this section, we conduct a series of quantitative experiments aimed at eliciting the ranking of the CT and CES, based on their relative cost-e¤ectiveness at reducing GHGs emissions in the electricity sector. We also explore sources of heterogeneity in this ranking.
We start by calibrating our model to macroeconomic data from the USA in the years 2012-2013.
Calibration
We calibrate parameter values of our model to represent as close as possible relevant fea- We start by normalizing basic parameters. We normalize the subsistence consumption of the numeraire to unity c = 1, so as to ensure that labor supply is sensitive to the income tax, R . We set the cost parameter for the innovation e¤ort at = c = d = 0:01.
Sensitivity analysis on these values do not bring any new qualitative insight into our cost e¤ectiveness analysis, and so will not be included in this paper.
According to the Internal Revenue Bulletin: 2013-5 of the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the average income tax for the seven brackets of rates in 2013 was 26.51%, we set R = 0:2651:According to the US bureau of Labor Statistics in 2012, the unemployment rate in USA was 6.67%. We take this …gure as a proxy the share of household time allocated The relative cost disadvantage of clean electricity varies depending on the renewable source used (e.g., hydropower, solar photovoltaic, windmill, etc.). In its 2013 Edition of Annual Energy Outlook, the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) by source for the period (2013-2018). The average LCOE for fossil fuels (conventional coal and gas) was 83.6$/MHh and the corresponding …gure for clean sources (solar, wind and hydroelectricity) was 160.84$/MHh. Taking these data, we claim that = 1:92. We later perform a sensitivity analysis to capture the e¤ect of varying this level of this relative cost-disadvantage.
The four remaining parameters ( ; ; and A) are simultaneously calibrated to match the following observational targets for the US economy with the corresponding statistics computed in the model.
1. The share of electricity in the USA generated from renewable sources (World Bank, 2012):
2. The share of total taxes revenue over GDP in the USA (OECD, 2013):
3. The emissions of GHGs in the USA in trillion of metric tons of GHGs (EIA, 2013):
4. The unemployment rate in the USA (US bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012):
where L D is de…ned in (2.8). Here, we assume that the proportion of total time endowment allocated to leisure, l, by the stand-in household matches the …gure for the unemployment rate in 2012, which equals 6.67%.
Since the equilibrium in the CT regime consists of a system of three equations with three unknowns, in total, the calibration procedure involves solving a nonlinear system of seven statistics ((3.10),(3.11),(3.16), (4.1),(4.2),(4.3) and (4.4) ) with seven unknowns (^ c , d ,^ y ; ; ; and A). As Table 1 shows, our model reproduces our four calibration targets perfectly. The baseline policy corresponds to d = x c = 0, or Laissez-faire. Table 2 
where the terms and ln G have been dropped since their respective levels are policyinvariant. 
Since Plant d's innovation e¤ort is designed to enhance its carbon capture and sequestration technology, when there is no carbon tax (i.e., d = 0), it has no incentive to invest in costly innovation. Hence d = 0.
Further, notice that the equilibrium wage in our baseline satis…es condition (2.12), implying that our Taylor Series approximation of the labor supply function preserves all the properties of the original labor supply function in (2.3).
Baseline Quantitative Experiment
In our baseline quantitative experiment, for each policy regime, we compute the income tax, R , and the level of the chosen policy instrument for which the pre-speci…ed emission reduction target, , is achieved subject to a revenue neutrality constraint, as in Goulder
We set the pre-speci…ed emissions reduction target at = 0:1. In other words, the Regulator wants to reduce the level of GHG emissions by 10% compared to the Laissez-faire scenario.
In the CT regime, the environmental and …scal policy vector, ( d ; R ) and equilibrium pro…ts ( c , d , y ) are jointly determined as the solution to following system of …ve equations in …ve unknowns: where E 0 and T 0 are the levels of emissions, and tax revenue, respectively, in the Laissezfaire.
In contrast, in the CES regime, the climate and …scal policy vector, ( x c ; R ), the equilibrium pro…ts ( c , d , y ) are jointly determined with the vector of plants' innovation e¤orts, ( c ; c ) as solution to the following system of seven equations in seven unknowns: Table 3 below: Line 10, Column 4, for the CT, and Line 10, Column 6 for the CES.
12 12 Our computations show that the necessary and su¢ cient condition for the CES to be binding, as de…ned is (3.19) , is satis…ed. This condition can be rewritten as follows:
Under the CES regime, the optimal x c yields f ( x c ) = 0:0016 which means that condition (3.19) indeed holds. The results of this experiment show that the CT is more cost-e¤ective than the CES, because the use of the yield a drop in welfare of 1:1517% relative to the Laissez-faire;
whereas the corresponding …gure the CES instead is 1:8360%, which is bigger.
Sensitivity Analysis
Note that the ranking of the CT and CES derived from the baseline experiment summarized in Table 3 Table 4 shows that an exogenous decrease in the level of the pre-existing cost-disadvantage of Plant c increases the ratio of clean, to total, electricity generated. The Laissez-faire values reported in Table 4 form the benchmark against which the performance of each of the two alternative instruments of climate policy will be measured.
Technically, the experiment underlying our sensitivity analysis consists solving (4.6) for the CT regime and (4. to produce clean electricity. In contrast, when is relatively small, diversi…cation of sources of clean electricity becomes too costly because the polluting plant no longer has the leeway that allows it to adequately invest in a CCS technology without losing its competitive edge.
This fact tends to hand the advantage to the CES that tends to induce specialization as feature of clean electricity production. It shows that the CES is more cost-e¤ective than the CT for less ambitious emissions reduction targets, with the reverse being true for more ambitious targets. This result is also re ‡ected in Panel (e) where a threshold emissions reduction target exists, below which the ratio of clean, to total, electricity generated is higher under the CES than under the CT, and above which the reverse is true. The intuition behind the heterogeneity of the ranking of the CT and the CES can also be perceived through the respective e¤ects of these two instruments on the electricity price. Figure 2 shows that as the cost-disadvantage decreases, the electricity price becomes higher under the CT than under CES. Since a high electictricy price is associtated with a lower level of production (as we can see in (2.16)), Figure 2 thus contributes to explain why the CES regime is more cost-e¢ cient than the CT regime for lower levels of .
Conclusion
Choosing the best instrument of climate policy is important for political jurisdictions aiming to make the most of their emissions control e¤orts. Despite the fact that …scal instruments such as the carbon tax have been gaining increased prominence around the world, the issue of which policy instrument is the best at mitigating GHG emissions remains contentious. In this paper, we develop a general-equilibrium model that provides the foundations of a quantitative experiment underlying the comparison between the CT and the CES, based on their relative e¤ectiveness at reducing GHG emissions in the electricity sector.
The main contribution of this paper is to compare these two policy instruments in an environment where the industrial organization of the generation side of the electricity sector is characterized by a two-stage, duopolistic, competition between a polluting plant and its non-polluting rival. The addition of market power and innovation as features of electricity generation opens the black box of the microeconomic e¤ects of climate policy on the economy, with implications for the ranking of alternative instruments for implementing this policy. A key insight of our analysis is that the CT has a diversi…cation e¤ect whereby it induces both the non-polluting plant and its polluting rival to contribute to expanding the clean electricity output; whereas, the CES has a specialization e¤ect whereby it tends to undermine the polluting plant's incentive to contribute to clean electricity production, essentially leaving the non-polluting plant as the only source of clean electricity.
We show that, what matters for the ranking of these two instruments of climate policy is the size of the pre-existing competitive gap between the two rival power plants. When this pre-existing competitive gap is large, only the CT-induced diversi…cation e¤ect can pave the way to a cost-e¤ective expansion of the clean electricity output. In contrast, when this gap is su¢ ciently small, the CES-induced specialization e¤ect becomes more e¤ective at driving a cost-e¤ective expansion of the clean electricity output.
Our quantitative cost-e¤ectiveness analysis not only replicates the main result of Goulder et al. (2016), whereby the CES dominates the CT only for less ambitious emissions reduction target, it goes further. It shows that the superiority of the CES over the CT on cost-e¤ectiveness grounds is not limited to less ambitious emissions reduction targets; but also extends to more ambitious targets as well, provided the pre-existing competitive gap between the two plants is su¢ ciently small. In that sense, our analysis uncovers a new source of heterogeneity in the ranking of these two instruments of climate policy.
Of course, there are a number of limitations to our study. First, we only focus on electricity-related GHG emissions, which are mostly localized emissions. Extending the study to include emissions that are not localized would probably increase the administrative costs of mitigating them with an intensity standard such as a CES, which then will tend to tip the balance in favor of …scal instruments. Second, in our model, we implicitly assumed that the polluting plant has reached the technological frontier in terms of the e¢ ciency with which it generates electricity with polluting sources. The non-polluting plant is the one that plays catch-up to the polluting plant through investment in a productivity-enhancing innovation. For the polluting plant, innovation is essentially restricted to improvements in its e¢ ciency at transforming "dirty", into "clean", electricity through a technological device such as the well-known carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) technology.
Appendix A
In this section we provide details on the computation of the Nash equilibrium of the twostage duopoly game. This game is solved given the speci…c instrument of climate policy used by the Regulator. Since the structure of the game is speci…c to each such instrument, we solve it for each instrument, starting with the CT and applying a backward induction process.
Second-Stage Subgame under the CT
We start with the second-stage subgame which is has Cournot structure. The Plants' respective payo¤s are:
where 2 c c = 0 (7.8)
Unfortunately, the above of system of two equations, (7.8 and 7.9), in two unknowns cannot be solved analytically. Its solution, however, can be implicitly de…ned as follows:
